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Intercollegiate athletics1 have been and continue to be a male do-
main that is particularly vulnerable to charges of sex discrimination.2
Congress addressed the general problem of sex discrimination in educa-
tion by enacting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.3 Title
IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational
program receiving federal aid.4 Although the statute will alter the
manner in which women are treated in education, the changes antici-
pated in intercollegiate athletics have received the most public atten-
tion and caused the greatest controversy. 5
The task of enforcing Title IX fell primarily to the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).6 Because of the broad lan-
guage of the statute, HEW has considerable leeway in formulating
regulations. After prolonged debate, HEW issued final regulations
covering intercollegiate athletics in 1975; 7 they took effect in 1978.8
As a result of the numerous complaints filed against institutions since
the compliance date,9 HEW has issued a proposed policy interpretation
1. Intercollegiate athletics are different from intramural athletics. Intramural athletics
focus on encouraging the greatest number of persons to participate, whereas intercollegiate
teams are highly competitive and represent the college or university in contests with
other schools.
2. See Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1977);
Gilbert & Williamson, Sport Is Unfair to Women (pt. 1), SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 28, 1973,
at 88-92. Although differential treatment of the two sexes exists in intramural programs,
it is particularly notable in intercollegiate sports. The women's share of college athletic
funding in 1977 was estimated at four to eight percent. Hogan, From Here to Equality:
Title IX, WOMENSPORTS, Sept. 1977, at 16. The average share of the budget allocated for
women's athletics at seven schools was 7.14%. Id. at 24. Women's participation rate has
also been much lower than men's; for example, in 1976-77, 395,000 students participated
in intercollegiate athletics and only 105,000 (26%) were women. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071
(1978). Furthermore, universities and colleges offer approximately six sports for women
as compared with 10 sports for men. Id.
3. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified primarily at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1976)). For a discussion of the forces motivating passage of Title IX, see Note, Sex Dis-
crimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IowA L. REv. 420, 457-58 (1975).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
5. Roach, Is Title IX Scoring Many Points In Field of Women's School Sports? N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 51, col. 1; see Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm, on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1975) (Rep. Schroeder) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
7. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1-.71 (1977).
8. Id. § 86.41(d) (intercollegiate athletics at secondary or postsecondary level should
comply as expeditiously as possible but no later than three years from July 21, 1975).
9. As of November 1978, HEW had received 93 complaints concerning more than 62
higher-educational institutions. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978).
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of the regulations. 10 This Note argues that the general language of the
statute, together with certain specific features of it, strongly suggest
that HEW should develop more stringent and demanding regulations.
It further suggests that in developing these regulations HEW should
look to social policy considerations concerning sex discrimination in
intercollegiate sports.
I. The Title IX Guidelines and the Existing Regulations
Title IX was passed without much debate about its effect on sports
and intercollegiate athletics." The statute's general language simply
prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal
aid.' 2 With respect to athletics, there is little to guide HEW in the
form of legislative history, and this absence of legislative guidance was
only slightly alleviated by the 1974 Javits Amendment to the statute13
requiring HEW to publish within thirty days Title IX regulations
"which shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities
reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports.'
4
Yet it is at least clear that the athletic programs of virtually every
major college and university lie within the scope of Title IX.' 5
10. Id. at 58,070.
11. Title IX was adopted in conference without formal hearings or a committee re-
port, see S. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22 (1972); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional
Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1369, 1388-89 (1977); sports were only mentioned twice in the congressional debate, 118
CONG. REc. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh) (personal privacy to be respected in sports facilities);
117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971) (Sen. Bayh) (intercollegiate football and men's locker rooms).
12. See p. 1261 infra (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976)).
13. Following the issuance of the proposed regulations, see p. 1257 infra, Senator
Tower proposed an amendment that would have exempted revenue-producing sports.
120 CONG. REc. 15,322 (1974); see Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside
HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEo. L.J. 49, 75-76 (1976). The Tower Amendment did not, how-
ever, survive in a Senate-House conference committee. S. CONF. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4206, 4271; see Note,
supra note 3, at 473. Instead the amendment proposed by Senator Javits was adopted.
Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974); see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 app. (1976).
14. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974); see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 app. (1976).
15. See Cox, supra note 2, at 36-40 (chronology of congressional activities indicates that
intercollegiate sports were intended to be covered by Title IX). But see Kuhn, supra note
13, at 62. It can hardly be disputed that the statute includes athletics by its terms, and
the subsequent legislative history leaves no doubt that this interpretation was intended.
In spite of this intended coverage, there is also a controversy as to whether intercollegiate
sports may be excluded from Title IX because they do not receive direct federal funding.
HEW's interpretation is that any program will be covered by Title IX if it "receives or
benefits from" federal funds. 45 C.F.R. § 86.11 (1977); see 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128, 86.11
(1975). The agency regards intercollegiate athletics as such an integral part of higher
education that sex discrimination in athletic programs "would necessarily infect" the
general educational experience at an institution and therefore must comply with Title
IX regardless of whether the activities receive direct federal funding. See 43 Fed. Reg.
58,076 (1978). Commentators remain divided over the validity of this interpretation. Corn-
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The statute permits HEW and other federal agencies authorized to
fund educational programs' 6 to withdraw that funding if an educational
institution fails to comply with the Title IX regulations. 17 However,
several controls were imposed on HEW's power to issue regulations.
First, any regulations proposed by HEW must receive presidential
approval.'8 Second, the statute provides for congressional review and
potential veto of all proposed regulations.' 9 Finally, Congress retains
the right to disapprove any termination of funds ordered by HEW.
2 0
HEW's 1974 proposed regulations2' appear to have been guided by
Title VI of The Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 as well as by developing
doctrines of equal protection as applied to women.2 3 In addition to a
general prohibition of sex discrimination in athletics, educational in-
stitutions were ordered to refrain from providing separate athletic pro-
grams on the basis of sex unless the selection of teams for that sport or
athletic program was based on competitive skill.2 4 The proposed regula-
pare Cox, supra note 2, at 37-39 (courts should adopt HEW's interpretation) and Todd,
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public
Schools, 53 TEx. L. REv. 103, 107-12 (1974) (although case law not firmly established,
"benefiting" approach is reasonable and desirable interpretation of Title IX and is
consistent with tax-exemption cases under Title VI) with Kuhn, supra note 13 ("benefit-
ing" approach is incorrect interpretation and is inconsistent with congressional intent)
and Note, supra note 3, at 463-66 (narrow interpretation of fund-termination remedy
would parallel Title VI). In addition, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
filed suit challenging HEW's interpretation. See NCAA v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D.
Kan. 1978) (dismissing NCAA claims for lack of standing and ripeness). Despite these
challenges, it seems likely that HEW's interpretations will be upheld, since its approach
to Title IX parallels its interpretation of a similar provision in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). See Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch,
414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969) (discrimination must be found in each individual
program but program should not be considered in isolation because it may be "so af-
fected by discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system that it thereby becomes
discriminatory").
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1232(d), (f (veto provisions made applicable to Title IX in 1974). The pro-
cedure is the equivalent of a veto because the proposed regulations are submitted to
Congress as a matter of course. Congress then has a specified time period, 45 days, in
which to set them aside; if the time lapses, the regulations become effective. This pro-
cedure represents a departure from the more usual practice in which regulations become
effective automatically and can be changed only by a new statute, passed by both houses
of Congress and signed by the President. See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 11.
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (no such termination "shall become effective until thirty
days have elapsed after the filing of such report" with committees of House and Senate).
A fund termination is also subject to judicial review. Id. § 1683.
21. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1974). Two sections of these regulations dealt with athletics: a
general section regarding athletics, id. at 22,236, and a subsidiary section concerning
athletic scholarships. Id.
22. 40 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see Comment, Title IX's Promise of Equality of Op-
portunity in Athletics: Does It Cover the Bases? 64 Ky. L.J. 432, 453 (1975).
23. Comment, supra note 22, at 435-36.
24. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,236 (1974).
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tions also required an annual student-interest survey2 and "affirma-
tive efforts"26 by each recipient institution to increase women's partici-
pation in sports. Equal aggregate expenditures for athletic programs for
each sex were specifically not required.2 7 Impassioned commentary and
lobbying28 by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
and others,2 9 however, led HEW3 0 to issue significantly narrower final
regulations in 1975.31
The final regulations still contain a general prohibition of sex dis-
crimination in any athletic program,32 a provision that follows naturally
from the broad language of the statute. Further, schools are generally
forbidden to provide separate teams in the same sport on the basis of
sex.3 3 There are now, however, two major exceptions to this rule: in
25. The survey was to determine "in what sports members of each sex would desire to
compete." Id. at 22,236, § 86.38(b). If adequate interest was demonstrated in a certain
sport, then the school could offer that sport and comply with the affirmative-efforts
requirement.
26. Id. § 86.38(c). "Affirmative efforts" were required in the provision of equal athletic
opportunities, information, support, and training in order to expand the capabilities and
interests of women.
27. Id. § 86.38(0.
28. During the public-comment period, the agency received over 9700 comments. 40
Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). A disproportionate number of these related to athletics. See Cox,
supra note 2, at 40; N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1975, at 17, col. 5.
29. Hearings, supra note 5, at 165 (Rep. Mink). The NCAA argued that the inter-
pretation of the statute should, if not exclude the coverage of athletics, then at least
exempt revenue-producing sports. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975); see Cox, supra note 2, at
40. But see Hearings, suPra note 5, at 103 (John A. Fuzak, President, NCAA) ("The NCAA
does not now advocate, and has never advocated, that revenue-producing sports be
exempted from Title IX. What we have advocated . . . is that the gross revenues from a
revenue-producing [sport] . . .be permitted to apply, first, to covering the expenses of
maintaining that sport.")
30. See Cox, supra note 2, at 41 ("[C]omments clearly had an impact on HEW because
the final athletics regulation differs in some significant respects from the proposed
regulation."); Note, supra note 3, at 474 ("[C]ertain express requirements .. . contained
in . . . proposed Title IX regulations . . . have either been severely diluted or totally
removed from the final draft.")
31. 45 C.F.R. § 86AI (1977); see Cox, supra note 2, at 63 (final regulation "retreated
from the proposed regulation"); Note, supra note 3, at 474 ("overall impact of Title IX
... appears to be less than was previously anticipated").
32. See 45 C.F.R. § 86A1(a) (1977):
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be
discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athlet-
ics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately
on such basis.
33. Id. § 86.41(b) (emphasis added):
(b) Separate Teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex
where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity in-
volved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a team
in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team
for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex
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addition to the competitive skill exception 34 of the proposed regula-
tions, HEW added an additional exemption for contact sports.35 By
virtue of the joint operation of these two exceptions, major intercol-
legiate sports, such as football and basketball, are exempted from the
general prohibition of sex discrimination and separate teams. Under
the competitive-skill exception, members of an excluded sex are allowed
to compete for a place on a team if only one team is provided in a
particular sport and if opportunities to participate in that sport have
been previously limited for the excluded sex.36 The addition of the
contact-sports exception means that, in such sports, members of one
sex do not have the right to try out for teams restricted to the other
sex even if they have no team of their own.
37
In addition, the regulations affirmatively state that schools shall pro-
vide "equal opportunity" and effectively accommodate the abilities of
members of both sexes.3 8 HEW has set forth a list of factors that it
will consider, though not require, to determine whether a school
has provided equal opportunity to women. 39 Among "other fac-
have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-
out for the team offered unless the sport is a contact sport. For the purposes of this
part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball
and other sports the purpose of [sic] major activity of which involves bodily contact.
34. By virtue of this competitive-skill exception, all intercollegiate sports were ex-
empted from the prohibition of separate teams. This exception is crucial for the existence
of intercollegiate sports, which are based upon the competitive skill of its teams and team
members. Presumably, a school could not merely open teams to either sex without pro-
viding equal opportunity for women to participate. Thus the competitive-skill exception
is balanced by the equal-opportunity provision, id. § 86.41(c), quoted in note 39 infra.
However, it is unclear whether a qualified woman would be permitted to play on an all-
male team if no women's team were provided.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1977).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 86.41(c)(1), quoted in note 39 infra.
39. See id.:
(c) Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, in-
tercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity
for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are available
the Director will consider, among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accom-
modate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures
for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will not
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tors" 4 this "laundry liSt '" 4 1 includes: selection of sports, levels of com-
petition, equipment, academic tutoring, locker rooms, facilities, medical
services, housing, and publicity.42 Equal aggregate expenditures for
members of each sex or for teams of each sex are specifically not
required, but may be considered. 43 Although this regulation requires
all expenditures "necessary" to achieve equal opportunity,44 it makes
no provision for "affirmative efforts" or an annual student-interest
survey.
45
The team structure that would result from these regulations is
difficult to discern. Separate teams are forbidden under the general
prohibition of sex discrimination but are permitted under its excep-
tions. On the other hand, even in cases in which these exceptions
operate, a requirement of separate teams might be derived from the
equal-opportunity provisions. 4" Thus, it is unclear to what extent
mixed and separate teams are required.
47
constitute non-compliance with this section, but the Director may consider the failure
to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity
for members of each sex.
40. Id.
41. See M. DUNKLE, COMPETITIVE ATHLETICS: IN SEARCH OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 41
(1976) ("Key Elements Of The Equal Opportunity 'Laundry List' ").
42. See note 39 supra (quoting "laundry list").
43. See id.
44. Id. There is no indication of the intended meaning of "necessary" expenditures.
Perhaps this refers to expenditures made for necessary items of the laundry list. "Neces-
sary" might well refer to equal expenditures per participant as opposed to equal overall
per capita expenditures. See pp. 1276-78 infra. Originally, HEW indicated that there
must not be disparate impact on opportunity because of unequal patterns of expendi-
tures. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of HEW, Elimination of Sex Discrimination
in Athletic Programs 8 (Sept. 1975) [hereinafter cited as HEW Memorandum]. However,
HEW's new policy interpretation is designed to supersede any inconsistent position in
the Memorandum, see 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 n.4 (1978), and it merely requires substantially
equal, average per capita expenditures per participant unless discrepancies are based on
either differences in costs of particular sports or their scope of competition, id. at 58,072.
45. Compare 39 Fed. Reg. 22,236, § 86.38(b), (c) (1974) with 45 C.F.R. § 86AI (1977).
46. Thus, even though separate teams are not required under the team provision, the
equal-opportunity section would not be satisfied if separate teams were not provided.
HEW Memorandum, supra note 44, at 6-7 (HEW does not consider provision of teams
opened for men and women with only few women able to qualify to constitute equal
opportunity; school must provide separate teams to accommodate both sexes effectively).
However, it appears that the regulations do not require that women of exceptional
athletic ability be allowed to try out for the men's team or that the women's team be
closed to men.
47. After issuing these regulations, HEW attempted to offer further guidance by com-
missioning a manual interpreting the regulations. See M. DUNKLE, supra note 41. Under
Ms. Dunkle's interpretation, equal opportunity between the two sexes is to be expected in
each of the factors of the "'laundry lisL'" Id. at 41-94. Furthermore, she discusses "'other
factors,'" id. at 124-35, which will also be considered in assessing a school's compliance.
Suggested "other factors" include awards and recognition, support services, "free or re-
duced admission to athletic events, priority use of campus recreational facilities, the
availability of bands and/or cheerleaders . . . preferential or different employment op-
portunities, opportunities to purchase 'varsity' items . . . , eligibility for membership in
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In order to clarify some of these ambiguities, HEW has recently
proposed a policy interpretation of the regulations. 4s Although this
interpretation is stringent in certain respects, it discovers additional
exceptions that essentially preserve the status quo.49 Further, the
legitimacy and constitutionality of the policy interpretation is uncer-
tain.50
II. The Relationship of the Regulations to the Statute
The basic problem in formulating satisfactory Title IX regulations
is translating the generalities of the statutory language into specific
varsity clubs, laundry or maid services." Id. at 127-28. Ms. Dunkle also makes no excep-
tion to the laundry list or to the scholarship provisions for men's basketball and foot-
ball, the major revenue-producing sports. Id. at 16. The athletic regulations are inter-
preted in conjunction with other parts of the regulations in order to broaden their scope.
For example, the recruitment of students in general is interpreted as applicable to
collegiate athletics. Id. at 120.
This interpretation is relatively aggressive; it would establish fairly stringent standards
under the equal-opportunity provision. However, the report has little authority compared
to the actual regulations, so its effect is uncertain. Various universities, prompted by the
NCAA, have resisted this expansive interpretation and have urged a narrower reading of
the regulations. Hogan, The Rumormongers, WOmENSPORTs, Nov. 1977, at 42 ("[Tlhe NCAA
was eager to find a way to discredit [Dunkle's report] ....NCAA officials are still in-
formally, but actively encouraging other schools to disregard the manual.")
48. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070 (1978).
49. The policy interpretation is based upon the agency's recognition of what it con-
siders to be five "fundamental facts," Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of HEV, Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, at 4 (Oct. 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as HEW
Draft], concerning intercollegiate athletics:
(1) there has been a historical emphasis on male sports; (2) disproportionately more
financial aid, funds, and resources go to male athletes; (3) there has been a recent increase
in women's participation despite past discrimination; (4) equalization of opportunities for
men and women will not necessarily require identical treatment; and (5) intercollegiate
football (and basketball) are often unique in size, cost, and revenue produced as com-
pared with other sports. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071-72 (1978).-The agency attempts to integrate
these "facts" into a two-stage approach to enforcement and compliance.
Part I aims to eliminate discrimination in existing programs. First, it provides for
equal, average per capita funds for scholarships, recruitment, and "other readily finan-
cially measurable benefits" (Fact 2). Per capita expenditures are based upon men and
women who are currently participating in intercollegiate programs. Differences in average
per capita expenditures may be allowed if they are based upon nondiscriminatory factors
such as differences in the costs, scope, and level of competition of a particular sport (Fact
5). Second, comparable benefits which are not readily financially measurable must be
provided for participating members of both sexes (Fact 4). Such benefits include practice
times, locker rooms, facilities, medical services, housing, and dining services. Id. at 58,072-
73.
Part II is designed to eliminate the effects of the historic emphasis on male sports
(Fact 1) and to require procedures to facilitate the continued expansion and growth of
women's athletics (Fact 3). Id. at 58,074. The goals of Part II are expected to be achieved
over a "reasonable time" as compared to the immediate results expected to be achieved
under Part I. Id. at 58,072; see note 124 infra.
50. The policy interpretation may be regarded as an attempt by the agency to rewrite
the regulations and to bypass the legislative-veto procedure. See p. 1256 supra.
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requirements for equality in collegiate sports. In the absence of specific
language and legislative history, HEW must look elsewhere for guid-
ance. An examination of the form and context of the statute suggests
that there are two sources of congressional intent that should be con-
sidered by HEW. First, the broadness of the statute is itself a type of
guideline. Second, the social policy factors that motivated Congress are
well known,51 even if they are not reported in the legislative history
in the context of athletics. Both these factors would suggest the pro-
mulgation of more exacting regulations.
A. Breadth of the Statute
Title IX states that "[n]o person .. .shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance. ' 52 Congress has thus mandated
nothing less than a general policy against sex discrimination in educa-
tion. 53 HEW was left to apply this general antidiscrimination principle
to the many diverse and specific programs of education.
With regard to sports there is no restriction, aside from a generalized
requirement of reasonableness, 54 on how this statutory goal is to be
achieved. One commentator has suggested that the reasonableness
standard manifests Congress's intent to restrict remedies in inter-
51. See Report of the Commissioner's Task Force, A Look at Women in Education:
Issues and Answers for HEW, in The Women's Educational Equality Act: Hearings on
H.R. 208 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 57-61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R.
208]; Sex Role Stereotypes Project, Final Report, in Hearings on H.R. 208, supra, at 183-
87. These studies document sex discrimination in athletics and education.
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
53. The Title IX general-prohibition language is virtually identical with the language
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), which prohibits
racial discrimination in federally assisted programs. Initially, Title IX was to be an
amendment to Title VI involving simply the addition of the word "sex" to Title VI. 117
CoNG. REc. 9822, 9829 (1971) (Rep. Green); see H.R. 916, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Dis-
crimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16,098 Before the Special
Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. Further, Title VI was being interpreted
broadly by HEW when Title IX was passed. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568
(1974) (sustaining HEW regulation under Title VI prohibiting discriminatory effect, even
in absence of intent); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1077-78 (5th Cir.
1969) (establishing broad definition of "program"); Hearings, supra note 5, at 164 (Rep.
Mink) (at time of Title IX debate, it was established that HEW and courts were inter-
preting Title VI broadly). The indication is that Congress intended such a broad in-
terpretation of Title IX. See id. at 169-70 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 163 (Rep. Mink);
118 CONG. Rae. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh) ("The provisions have been tested under Title
VI ... for the last 8 years so that we have evidence of their effectiveness ....")
54. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974); see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 app. (1976)
(Javits Amendment).
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collegiate sports as opposed to admissions, hiring, and other areas
covered by the statute.55 There is, however, no indication that Congress
intended unreasonable provisions or remedies for any of the statute's
areas. Because reasonable regulations are expected in any event, the
standard is an empty and ambiguous one. If reasonableness is to have
any content, it should be viewed as Congress's understanding that
remedies may have to be different, not necessarily narrower, when the
physical differences of the sexes are significant.56 The reasonableness
standard suggests that Congress contemplated flexible, broad regula-
tions;57 were the intent to restrict agency authority, Congress would
have made its guidelines more precise.
A second important indication of congressional intent is Congress's
retention of what is in effect a veto over any proposed regulations. 8
The purpose of the veto was to provide a check on Congress's delega-
tion of power to the agency.59 Self-restriction by the agency due to a
fear of usurpation of congressional power ° is, therefore, not necessary,
because the veto provides Congress with the ability to restrict agency
actions in such circumstances. The fact that Congress so structured its
power of review implies that it wishes HEW to take a creative and
aggressive role in formulating regulations and to implement the
broadest possible interpretation of the statute. If the regulations are
too broad, Congress retains the power to veto them.
Moreover, the contrary argument that Congress intended the veto to
overturn narrow regulation is unpersuasive. If the regulations were too
narrow, Congress could not reject them without leaving intended
beneficiaries remediless for a considerable period of time.61 In addi-
55. See Kuhn, supra note 13, at 75-76 (Javits amendment and reasonableness standard
manifest congressional intent to limit remedy for intercollegiate sports because these
sports were not intended to be covered).
56. "Reasonableness" is also an appropriate standard in light of privacy concerns. Al-
though this is supported by Senator Bayh's remarks during the debate, 118 CONG. REC.
5807 (1972), legislative intent regarding reasonableness is far from clear.
57. Hearings, supra note 5, at 164 (Rep. Mink) (legislative history and debate demon-
strate that Title IX was to be applied broadly through regulations).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)-(g) (1976); see note 19 supra. In addition to the veto over the
proposed regulations, Congress also retained a veto over the actual application of the
regulations-the cutoff of funds. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). This is thus a further reason to
interpret the statute broadly; if a special case arose under strict regulations, Congress
would still have the power to intervene.
59. H.R. REP. No. 805, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1974).
60. Part of the uneasiness with the administrative process-to which the veto is ad-
dressed-has been the concern over the constitutionality of the delegation of power to
agencies. See Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 1041 (1975).
61. This in fact was suggested as a reason not to veto the 1975 regulations; the need
for more specificity was desirable but outweighed by the need to fulfill reasonable ex-
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tion, the significant constitutional questions raised by the legislative
veto 2 would be exacerbated by a provision designed not to curb agency
excess, but rather to override enforcement decisions by the executive
branch. Because a power to veto narrow regulations would permit
Congress to circumvent the constitutional requirement that the Presi-
dent approve all laws not passed by two-thirds of the members of each
house,63 it is likely that Congress could only disapprove narrow regula-
tions by passing a new, broader statute. 4
Finally, the specific nature of the problem of sex discrimination in
athletics suggests the need for explicit guidelines; if these guidelines
are not provided in the statute, they must be provided by regulations.
Congress passed Title IX in the face of longstanding sexual stereotypes
that led educational institutions to make arbitrary distinctions. Thus,
an overriding purpose of the statute was to determine the nature of
equality for men and women in contexts in which their differences are
particularly relevant;65 regulations designed to implement this pur-
pose must necessarily be clear and comprehensive. Otherwise, arbitrary
stereotypes will ensure that existing patterns of sex discrimination con-
tinue.00
pectations of a timely remedy. See, e.g., Letter from Caspar w. Weinberger, Secretary of
HEW to Carl B. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (June 4, 1975), reprinted
in Hearings, supra note 5, at 6.
62. The major constitutional objections are that the veto power allows the legislative
branch to invade the powers and functions of the executive and violates the general
separation-of-powers doctrine. See id. (agency regards review procedure as "questionable
on practical as well as constitutional grounds"). See generally Boisvert, A Legislative Tool
for Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REv.
638, 651-61 (1956-57); Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIs.
593 (1976).
63. See Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 11, at 1373-75.
64. From this perspective, it seems clear that HEW was obligated to tailor its regula-
tory scheme to the maximum permissible scope of Title IX. As indicated above, the fact
that none of the resolutions of disapproval passed, see Comment, HEWs Regulation
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976
B.Y.U. L. Rsv. 133, 146-47 & n.64, should not be taken as an indication that the regula-
tions do in fact fulfill the requirements of Title IX. For, as this Note argues, the
regulations desired by HEW fail to accommodate the broad social policy objectives under-
lying Title IX.
65. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment:
A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893-96 (1971) (dis-
cussion of equality when physical differences exist).
66. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 287-92 (statement of Margaret Dunkle for
Women's Equity Action League (WEAL)) (10 myths and stereotypical assumptions that
limit sports opportunities for women); Interview with Frank Ryan, Director of Athletics,
Yale University (Apr. 21, 1978) (wrestling is inappropriate for women and mixed wrestling
is certainly undesirable; it is incomprehensible why women would want to play football)
(transcript on file with Yale Law Journal). But see note 149 infra (Yale University's
support under Dr. Ryan of women's ice hockey and crew).
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B. Social Policy
The second major source of congressional intent that HEW should
consider in promulgating regulations is the social policies that moti-
vated Title IX.67 In a very real sense, they constitute the legislative
history of the statute.68 Although these policies cannot be known with
certainty, they can be identified with reasonable accuracy by reference
to the legislative history of other antidiscrimination statutes. 60 The
social-policy orientation thus revealed is, in fact, within the precise
field of HEW's expertise.70 It is proper that HEW look to these policies
in issuing regulations. Indeed, it is arguable that the statute's broad
language authorizes HEW to consider social policy.
The stated goal of Title IX is the elimination of sex discrimination
in education. 71 The legislative policy underlying Title IX is relatively
clear, and consists of two principal elements. The first is a desire to
ensure all Americans, regardless of sex, equal access to educational op-
portunities so that they can develop their full potential.7 2 The second
is to eliminate sex stereotyping that results from channelling men into
one group of activities and women into another. 73 These elements are
closely related since limitations on opportunities create stereotypes and
stereotypes limit opportunities.
Both of these general policies apply to collegiate athletics. Sex dis-
crimination in athletics is particularly painful to the individual woman
athlete.7 4 Denial of the opportunity to participate in school programs
may halt a young woman's athletic development and may limit her
ability to pursue an athletic career. She is denied not only the physical
67. See Note, supra note 3, at 457-84 (discussing social problems of sex discrimination
and Title IX as Congress's response to those problems).
68. Cf. id. at 457, 458 (Title IX is Congress's attempt to eliminate sex discrimination
in education); Comment, supra note 64, at 137-42 (same).
69. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (forbidding race discrimination in federally aided
educational programs and activities); see note 53 supra. The social policy of eliminating
any form of race discrimination was clearly identified as being the basis for the passage
of Title VI. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973) (purpose of statute was to
eliminate race discrimination); [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 2355-519. Certainly,
the basic purpose and policy of Title IX was to eliminate sex discrimination and sex
stereotyping in education.
70. HEW was directed by the Office of Management and Budget to "coordinate the
efforts of the several agencies that fund education programs" and "to provide leadership
by drafting a regulation that would be suitable both for its own use and . . . the other
agencies involved." Comment, supra note 64, at 145.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
72. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 168-72 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 172 (Title
IX is to provide American women "something that is rightfully theirs-an equal chance"
in education).
73. 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (Sen. Bayh) (need for strong measure to end stereotypes).
74. See D. Burr, PSYCHOLOGY OF SPORT 68 (1976) (psychological and cultural problems
of role conflict for female athletes).
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benefits of participation but also the generally acknowledged psycho-
logical benefits.75 Even when participation is grudgingly allowed, a
young woman may suffer from psychological role conflicts or more
subtle discrimination."6 The cumulative effect is the dampening of
women's interest in sport, often to the extent that they do not even
consider the possibility of participation.77
The development of the woman athlete thus requires equality of
participation in group athletics. Although equality on an individual
basis might simply demand sex-blind sports teams, equality on a group
basis demands more.7 8 Whether for biological or cultural reasons, dif-
ferences do exist in the performance levels of sportswomen and sports-
men.79 These differences must be realistically dealt with so that the
sportsmen's superior performance is not made the basis for inequality,
but is simply accepted as a performance dissimilarity.80 Certainly, Con-
gress did not intend merely to give women an equal opportunity to
compete with men and thus, as a practical matter, foreclose them from
participation in intercollegiate sports.8 ' HEW must, therefore, balance
the goals of equal opportunity and equal participation.
Even more important than the athletic development of women is
the symbolic role of intercollegiate sports, and its consequent ability
to generate and reinforce sex stereotypes.8 2 Title IX looks as much to
group equalization as it does to individual potential. Congress has
75. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 197 (Rep. McKinney); Gilbert g: Williamson, supra
note 2, at 90. But see Schafer, Sport and Youth Counterculture: Contrasting Socialization
Themes, in D. LANDERS, SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ATnLETICS 183 (1976) (questioning social
value of personality traits developed through participation in highly competitive athletics).
76. See p. 1268 infra.
77. Gilbert & Williamson, Are You Being Two-Faced? (pt. 2), SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June
4, 1973, at 47 (female apathy regarding sports results from discrimination).
78. The response that if women desire equality in athletics, they must compete against
men is "preposterous," see E. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BERLIN & W. WYRICK, THE AMERICAN
WOMAN IN SPORT 406 (1974) [hereinafter cited as E. GERBER], in light of analysis of statis-
tical and objective studies of performance comparisons, see id. at 406-515.
79. Although the differences in performances are partly due to cultural expectations,
many are traceable to actual physical differences. Id. at 429-30, 484. The superior size and
strength of sportsmen account for many of the performance differences and are due in
part to physiological differences: men have larger hearts, greater stroke volume, cardiac
output, lung capacity, hemoglobin content, and thus higher aerobic capacity. Id. at 484.
Even when the sizes are the same, women are only about 80% as strong as men because
women have only about half the muscle mass of men. Id. at 427-29.
80. Id. at 429-30. After all, although the heavyweight boxer would out-box the light-
weight, both must be respected within their own discipline. Id. at 430.
81. See Cox, supra note 2, at 44 (overall decrease in women's participation would
result if equality only meant opportunity to compete).
82. See E. GERBER, supra note 78, at 182 (sport reflects and perpetuates cultural norms
of sex stereotypes); J. TALAuMINI & C. PAGE, SPORT AND SocIETY 271-72 (1973) (sexual one-
sidedness of sport and sociological stereotypes).
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recognized the fundamental impact that education has on the develop-
ment of sex roles.
83
The introduction of Title IX was accompanied by repeated refer-
ences to the 1970 hearings84 that documented the "massive, persistent
patterns" of sex discrimination in education.8 5 The hearings stressed
the socialization of women into stereotypical roles"0 and the need to
create viable opportunities for women to produce "ideas, art, litera-
ture, leadership, inventions, and healthier social relationships" instead
of only producing children.87 These hearings, together with the recom-
mendations of a presidential task force, began a legislative process that
culminated in Title IX88 and thus form an integral part of the relevant
legislative history. In 1970, Congress intended the eradication of sex
discrimination in education to reduce sex-role stereotyping in the rest
of society,89 and subsequent sex-discrimination hearings further demon-
strated this intent.90
This focus on group equalization and the elimination of sex stereo-
types is particularly relevant to sport, in which the symbolic role clearly
outweighs the practical effect. The symbolic importance of sports in
American society is undoubted,9 1 but is often ignored or discounted.9 2
Even after the rise of concern for women's rights and congressional
83. See 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (Sen. Bayh) ("The field of education is just one of
many areas where differential treatment has been documented; but because education
provides access to jobs and financial security, discrimination here is doubly destructive
for women."); id. ("We are all familiar with the stereotype of women as pretty things
who go to college to find a husband, go on to graduate school because they want a more
interesting husband, and finally marry, have children, and never work again.")
84. See id. at 5804 (discussing 1970 Hearings, supra note 53). For a summary of the
evidence of the 1970 Hearings, see Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based
on Sex: An Overview, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 237, 247-70 (1971).
85. 118 CONG. l.c. 5804, 5805 (1972) (Sen. Bayh).
86. See, e.g., 1970 Hearings, supra note 53, at 122 (Wilma Heide, Commissioner of
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission) (need to challenge mythologies about sex
caste divisions of labor and stereotypes); Bem & Bem, Case Study of a Nonconscious
Ideology: Training the Woman to Know Her Place, in D. BEM, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES AND
HUMAN AFFAIRS 89 (1970), reprinted in 1970 Hearings, supra note 53, at 1042-49 (non-
conscious ideology of sex stereotypes).
87. 1970 Hearings, supra note 53, at 122; see id. at 611, 1042-49; 118 CoNG. REc. 5804
(1972) (Sen. Bayh).
88. 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (Sen. Bayh); see Women's Equality Act of 1971, H.R.
916, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
89. Congress was particularly concerned with sex stereotyping in the job market. See
1970 Hearings, supra note 53, at 122-23; cf. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2330, 2356 (1976) (voca-
tional-education amendments that specifically require programs to reduce sex stereotyping
and to assist women in entering fields traditionally occupied by men).
90. See Hearings on H.R. 208, supra note 51, at 141. 186-87 (occupational channeling
according to sex stereotypes and crucial role of education in fostering these stereotypes).
91. See H. EDWARDS, SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 90 (1973) (sport is quasi-religious institution).
92. D. LANDERS, supra note 75, at 3 (sport is "mirror of societal values," but detailed
analyses of competitive sports have been neglected).
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passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, sport has been viewed as a
socially unimportant area 3 to be integrated only as a part of more
general efforts.
4
This viewpoint ignores the underlying power of sport as a social in-
stitution 95 in perpetuating sex stereotypes throughout society.0 6 As a
socializing agent, sport requires "conformity to certain normative values
and behaviors. 0°7 These values, themselves based on stereotypes, are
internalized by individuals. 8 The process is particularly notable in
educational institutions, which have such a strong effect on role models
and self-images. 0
The role models thus fostered have long been based on traditional
images of masculinity and femininity.100 The traditional concept of
masculinity asserts that the route to excellence is through aggression,
discipline, and competition.' 0 ' The traditional concept of femininity
presents women as weak, passive, submissive, and nurturant, their
destiny fulfilled by marriage and general subservience. 10 2 According to
these constructs, sport as an abstraction is masculine; it institutionalizes
a behavioral mode that conforms to the masculine image.'0 3 Participa-
93. See Hogan, supra note 2, at 18 (feminists "have skipped over the plight of women
athletes"). In fact, sport is virtually absent from the works of leading feminists. See gen-
erally SISTERHOOD is POWERFUL (R. Morgan ed. 1970) (anthology of feminist writing).
94. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 280 (Ms. Polowy, Associate Counsel of American
Association of University Professors) (athletics is one of many educational programs that
should be available to both sexes).
95. See H. EDWARDS, supra note 91, at 84; E. GERBER, suPra note 78, at 182.
96. See H. EDWARDS, supra note 91, at 90 ("[S]port is a social institution which has
primary functions in disseminating and reinforcing the values regulating behavior....
This channelling affects not only perspectives on sport, but . . . affects and aids in
regulating perceptions of life in general. And herein lies the primary significance of sport
as an institution."); E. GERBER, suPra note 78, at 182-88.
97. E. GERBER, supra note 78, at 185.
98. Id. at 187; see H. EDWARDS, supra note 91, at 84 (institutional norms are in-
ternalized by individual personalities).
99. Hearings, supra note 5, at 169 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (education is primary
vehicle for socialization and "[t]o the extent that the school system treats women as
second-class citizens, inferior to their male classmates ... women will continue to occupy
the lower economic strata of the society"); Note, supra note 3, at 423.
100. See Gilbert & Williamson, supra note 2, at 92-98 (stereotypes in collegiate ath-
letics); Note, supra note 3, at 423-24 (sport channels individuals into "proper" and tradi-
tional sex roles).
101. Hearings, supra note 5, at 197 (Rep. McKinney) ("Competitive sports require
discipline, leadership, aggressiveness, all traditionally considered male characteristics."); E.
GERBER, supra note 78, at 184 ("Sport represents .. . the opportunities to aggress and
prove self, believed to be inherent male instincts; and the demand for perseverence and
comparison, elements of male assertiveness.")
102. Hearings, supra note 5, at 197 (Rep. McKinney) ("CWomen are encouraged to be
weak and passive."); D. BuTrrT, supra note 74, at 63 (females traditionally assigned socio-
emotional role to satisfy needs of others).
103. Athletics emphasize aggressiveness, competitiveness, and strength, as does the
traditional male role. E. GERBER, supra note 78, at 182, 184; see Hearings, supra note 5,
at 197 (Rep. McKinney).
1267
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1254. 1979
tion by women is thus a social anomaly;104 they must be "different" if
they "break the social taboo against" their participation. 10 5
As a result, women have developed "apologetics"' 00 to explain their
participation in sports. This has naturally evolved into the idea that
sport for women should not be highly competitive or aggressive, and
should not be taken as seriously as sport for men.10 7 Although the
apologetics minimize the social anomaly of women's participation, they
also serve to reinforce the underlying assumption that men's sports are
more important.'
08
Sex stereotyping of this sort tends both to deter the development of
alternative, socially desirable characteristics in both men and women'00
and to perpetuate the traditional images that Congress desired to
eliminate. Continued sex stereotyping means that society and male
athletes are likely to retain traditional attitudes evincing a lack of
respect for women,"10 while women athletes persist in regarding them-
104. See D. Burr, supra note 74, at 63 (female athlete is study of role conflict); H.
EDWARDS, supra note 91, at 232.
105. Weber, The Long March, WOMENSPORTS, Sept. 1974, at 75, reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 5.
106. E. GERBER, supra note 78, at 203-08. Women tend to defend their athletic participa-
tion as still conforming to the feminine image. "While most young female athletes today
know that these traditional attitudes are nonsense, many of them still feel a need to
defend their positions." Weber, supra note 105, at 75. This need to defend participation
arises from the fact that most female athletes are "forced by cultural definitions to choose
between an athlete (thereby facing barely hidden suspicions as to the degree of their
heterosexuality) and their womanhood." H. EDWARDS, supra note 91, at 232.
107. H. EDwARDs, supra note 91, at 232; E. GERBER, supra note 78, at 205-06. This is
manifested by a tendency for women to limit their athletic pursuits to "feminine" sports,
to stress the importance of intramural rather than intercollegiate sports, and to avoid
exhibition and expenditure of money for equipment. Id.
108. E. GERBER, supra note 78 at 206; Weber, supra note 105, at 75 (circular argument
that "[w]omen are poorer athletes-even if inferior treatment has made them this way-
and they don't deserve the kind of training or equipment given men. Women don't draw
spectators-even if limited media coverage has stifled interest-so there's no reason to
give them publicity or to let them run expensive programs .... )
109. See, e.g., D. BuTT, supra note 74, at 63-64, 68 (harmful psychological effects of
sexism on men and women). Greater maturity would be achieved "through a merging of
the major social traits of both sexes." Id. at 64. See generally E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENC.S (1974) (exploring sex differences and concluding that
development may be impeded by extreme sex-role stereotyping); Lever, Sex Differences in
the Complexity of Children's Play and Games, 43 Am. Soc. REv. 471 (1978) (importance
of sports participation for cognitive development and resulting harmful effect on girls
due to sex-role differentiation).
110. See generally Schafer, supra note 75, at 192-93, 196 (athletics, as social institution,
promote participants' acceptance of status quo). The depth and seriousness of the prob-
lem is particularly evident when the judicial system imposes these norms on individuals.
See Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., Civ. No. 12-49-27
(Conn. Super. Ct., New Haven County Mar. 29, 1971), appeal dismissed mem., 295 A.2d
671 (1972) (dismissing equal protection challenge to enforcement of discriminatory track-
event rules) ("The present generation of our male population has not become so decadent
that boys will experience a thrill in defeating girls in running contests . . . .whether
the girls be members of their own teams or an adversary team .... Athletic competition
builds character in our boys. We do not need that kind of character in our girls ....")
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selves as less important, less competitive, and less effectual than men.
The elimination of these sports-related stereotypes and their detri-
mental effect on society in general constitutes the basic social policy
underlying Title IX.
III. Assessment of the Existing Regulations and Possible Alternatives
Evaluation of the 1975 regulations in terms of the relevant criteria-
the broad language of the statute and underlying social policy con-
cerns-suggests that the regulations are inadequate. HEW should utilize
its expertise and independence to develop alternative regulations that
fulfill Title IX's mandate. Alternative regulations should be based on
a liberal interpretation of the statute in light of underlying social
policies. These social policies indicate the specific goal that regula-
tion should address, while the principle of broad interpretation can
generate reasonable regulations of an appropriately stringent nature.
A. The 1975 Regulations
The 1975 regulations have a number of serious weaknesses. First, the
required team structure is not altogether clear. It appears that the
equal-opportunity section prevails over the separate-team provisions
so that a college cannot comply merely by allowing women to compete
for places on men's teams.' 1 However, the requirement of separate
teams for women if there is adequate interest in a particular sport does
not address equality for exceptional women athletes. The regulations
do not require that men's teams be mixed in order to allow exceptional
women to compete at a sufficiently high level."12 Although this failure
may not violate the equal protection rights of the exceptional woman
athlete, the regulations do not meet the group-equalization require-
ments of Title IX." 3 Further, the regulations are silent concerning
the problem of men who may desire to compete on women's teams in a
sport not offered for men. Finally, the most egregious aspect of the
required team structure is that if only a minority of women are inter-
111. See pp. 1257-58 supra.
112. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1977).
113. See pp. 1265-66 supra. The results of equal protection challenges to men-only
teams sometimes turn on whether or not a women's team is provided. Compare Bucha v.
Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (rejecting bid of excep-
tional women athletes to play on male team when female team existed) with Haas v.
South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972) (upholding
challenge to rule prohibiting participation of girls on boys' team when no team pro-
vided for girls). Thus HEW's reliance on ambiguous equal protection standards appears
misplaced, since sex is not yet a "suspect" classification demanding strict review and
Title IX does mandate such review.
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ested in a contact sport-a likely result until effects of past discrimina-
tion are eliminated-the regulations do not require that these women
be allowed to compete. 114 Thus, although the overall team-structure
requirements might appear to encompass neutral standards that disre-
gard distinctions between sexes, in fact they result in continued dis-
crimination." 15
The laundry list of the equal-opportunity section" 6 is an incomplete
and inadequate basis for assessing equal treatment in collegiate ath-
letics, since its application is limited. More importantly, although in-
stitutions must achieve overall equal opportunity, equality is not re-
quired in each area on the list;" 7 the regulations only require HEW to
"consider" each area."18 Such consideration may involve a balancing
process that permits equality or even mere improvement in one area
to compensate for inequality in another.119 Although the flexibility of
the regulations has been praised, 20 this much flexibility may lead not
only to unequal enforcement, but also to no enforcement at all. With-
out equality in each area, elimination of sex stereotypes is impossible.
The most serious defect of the laundry list is its funding provision.'2 '
The disparity between men's and women's sports is most noticeable in
their respective budgets. 22 Yet the regulations not only do not provide
for, but do not even differentiate between, equal aggregate expendi-
tures, per capita expenditures, or per-participant expenditures. Thus,
the provision fails to provide the necessary practical basis for equality
and symbolically furthers an idea of group equalization based on in-
114. 45 C.F.R. § 86Al(b) (1977); see HEW Memorandum, suPra note 44, at 6-7.
115. Facially neutral standards that have a discriminatory impact on one sex may
violate the equal protection clause. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
116. 45 C.F.R. § 86AI(c) (1977); see pp. 1258-59 suPra.
117. See Cox, supra note 2, at 50 ("each factor need not be present equally in all
circumstances").
118. See 45 C.F.R. § 86A1(c) (1977).
119. It would be reasonable to assume, however, that HEW would not find equal
opportunity to exist without equality in a majority of the factors. See 43 Fed. Reg.
58,072 (1978) (policy interpretation measures compliance in overall terms to allow maxi-
mum institutional flexibility); HEW Memorandum, supra note 44, at 7-8 (HEW will not
require identical treatment in all matters but will use laundry list to assess equality of
total athletic program).
120. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 197 (Rep. McKinney); Cox, supra note 2, at
63-64.
121. See Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union to HEW on the Proposed
Regulations Under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, at 14 (Sept. 27,
1974), reprinted in AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION WOMEN'S RIGHTS PRoJECT, SEX DIS-
CRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS AND PHYSICAL EDUCATION (1975) (implementation of Title IX
"cannot be assured unless equal per capita expenditures for each sex are required") [here-
inafter cited as ACLU Comments].
122. See note 2 supra.
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equality. The weakness of the expenditure provision is also evident in
its lack of clarity. The failure of a school to provide "necessary funds"
may be considered in assessing the equality of its program, 123 but
"necessary funds" not only is not explicitly defined, there is little
indication of what it refers to. 2 4
A related weakness is the lack of a provision regarding intercollegiate
revenue-producing sports, primarily men's basketball and football,'125
even though these sports are at the core of the controversy involving
Title IX and intercollegiate athletics. 26 HEW has exempted these
sports from the requirement of integration through the contact-sports
exception,'12 but there is no exemption from the equal-opportunity
requirement. Therefore, the "laundry list" should still be "considered"
with respect to these two sports. 128 HEW may, however, interpret the
two requirements interdependently so that an exemption from one will
123. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (1977).
124. HEW has recently indicated that the funding provision will be interpreted as
requiring equal per capita expenditures per participant. See note 49 supra. However,
several interpretative and substantive problems remain. Immediate problems are raised
regarding the definition of "participant"; is it the number of persons before or after
tryouts for a particular sport? Moreover, the requirement is subject to substantial excep-
tions, see id., that render the meaning of the proposal unclear. "Non-discriminatory"
factors-nature of the sport, level and scope of competition, and costs of a particular
sport-are not defined. See White, Colleges Mystified by Title IX Fund Rules, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 15, 1978, § A, at 27, col. I.
The exceptions are, of course, aimed at recognizing the "unique" characteristics of foot-
ball and major revenue-producing sports, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070, 58,072 (1978), and at allow-
ing these sports to continue to operate at high expenditure levels. However, the unique
characteristics of football, essentially its size and cost, are a likely result of past dis-
crimination. Thus the beneficial effect of the per capita requirement is substantially
lessened by excluding the costs of these sports from an estimation of equal expenditures.
In addition, any beneficial results from the enforcement of the policy interpretation may
be subject to attack because it does not have the force and legitimacy of the regulations.
See note 50 supra.
125. Basketball and football are most frequently cited as the major revenue-producing
sports. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 47 (Darrell Royal, President, American Football
Coaches Association); id. at 167 (Rep. Mink).
126. See, e.g., id. at 46-66, 98-121 (testimony disapproving regulations -focuses on
revenue-producing sports).
HEW has refused to adopt an NCAA proposal to exempt revenues or revenue-producing
sports. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128, at j 73, 74 (1975). But this is a far cry from a positive step
to include them. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 476 n.328 ("[b]y negative implication
therefore, a college or university, may well be able to initially channel revenues back to
these sports"). As a result, the NCAA now takes the position that Title IX does not
require elimination of differences that are due to something other than sex discrimina-
tion, i.e., production of revenue. See Comments of the NCAA to HEW on the Proposed
Regulations on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance (Oct. 15, 1974), quoted in Note, supra
note 3, at 477. Without adopting an outright exemption for revenue sports, HEW has
accepted the concept of "sex-neutral" factors to allow differential funding. HEW Draft,
supra note 49, at 7.
127. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1977).
128. Id. § 86.41(c).
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be considered an exemption from the other. Moreover, even within
the equal-opportunity requirement, exceptions for these two sports may
be tolerated in some areas if they are balanced in other areas. 129 Since
the disparity between men's and women's athletics is particularly
notable when these revenue-producing sports are concerned, 30 any
exceptions for them appear to be based on a flagrant disregard of the
breadth and underlying social policies of Title IX. It is these male
revenue-producing sports that are the strongest reinforcement of the
traditional social constructs of masculinity and femininity.
The treatment of athletic scholarships in the regulations is also
seriously inadequate.' 3 ' An institution is permitted to distribute schol-
arships among both sexes as it chooses as long as it provides "rea-
sonable opportunities" to members of both sexes .'32 Awards are to be
in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in
intercollegiate athletics. 33 Nonetheless, additional scholarships may be
provided to members of separate athletic teams that are permitted
under the competitive-skill and contact-sports exceptions.' 3 4 This rule
is especially unacceptable because most revenue-producing sports will
fall within these two exceptions. 3 5 Since revenue-producing sports are
129. See p. 1270 & note 119 supra. Under HEW's proposed policy interpretation,
financially measurable benefits, such as equipment, supplies, travel expenses, and pub-
licity, must be substantially equal because of the equal per capita expenditure requirement.
However, differences in expenditures may be justified if they are caused by "differences
in costs, levels of competition, and other non-discriminatory factors." 43 Fed. Reg. 58,073
(1978). Such factors are aimed at allowing differential treatment of football. See notes 49
& 124 supra. Benefits that are not financially measurable need only be "comparable."
Further discrepancies in the ratio of coaches to male and female athletes will be accepted
if they are a "result of non-discriminatory factors required by the nature of a particular
sport." 43 Fed. Reg. 58,073 (1978). Housing and dining facilities must be comparable; but
a separate dormitory may be provided for male athletes and not for female athletes if no
additional services are provided to men as a consequence of their separate housing facil-
ities. Id. at 58,074.
130. See Hogan, supra note 2, at 24 (examples of disparities between overall men and
women's budgets and disparities between women's overall budgets and men's football).
131. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.37(c) (1977):
(c) Athletic scholarships. (1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholar-
ships or grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for
members of each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participat-
ing in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each sex may be
provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each sex to the extent
consistent with this paragraph and § 86.41.
132. Id. § 86.37(c)(1).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 86.37(c)(2). Contact sports and competitive skill are the only exceptions to
the requirement of mixed teams. However it is most probable that more men will be
participating in sports because of these two exceptions and thus will be eligible for a
greater proportion of the scholarships.
135. Hearings, supra note 5, at 167 (Rep. Mink) ("The regulation promulgated by
HEW in fact exempts the so-called revenue sports under the 'contact sports' provision.
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characterized by recruitment techniques 30 that involve an unusually
high number of financially attractive scholarships the exception will
tend to vitiate the rule.
Finally, the regulations fail to deal with athletic associations such as
the NCAA. Often, it is the athletic association to which a school belongs
that has fought against the implementation of Title IX.137 Such in-
fluential opposition should be regulated under the statute. Admit-
tedly, the regulations provide that the rules of any organization
limiting participation on the basis of sex do not obviate the school's
obligation to comply with the regulations. 38 Furthermore, under the
regulations' general-education section, a school is forbidden to support
any organization that discriminates on the basis of sex.' 39 There is no
such provision in the athletic sections of the regulations, however, and
the question whether this provision will be enforced in athletics re-
mains unanswered.
40
B. Suggestions for Alternative Regulations
There are several changes that should be made in the regulations in
order to implement the statute's overall social-policy goal of eliminating
sex discrimination and sex stereotyping. These proposals would not
only comport with social needs, but also with the statute's "reason-
ableness" standard.
14 1
1. The Structure of the Athletic System: Mixed and
Separate-Sex Teams
The structure of intercollegiate teams should reflect a balance of
individual equality and group equality. The competitive-skill excep-
tion must therefore remain a part of the regulations, since this is the
Football and basketball are exempt, scholarships in those sports are exempt to the same
degree, and there is no requirement of comparability for women.") The proposed policy
interpretation does not remedy the situation. Scholarships and recruiting are classified as
financially measurable benefits and thus are subject to the per capita expenditure require-
ment and its exceptions for nondiscriminatory programmatic decisions. 43 Fed. Reg.
58,073 (1978); see notes 49 & 124 sukra.
136. See PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, WHAT CONSTITUTES
EQUALITY FOR WOMEN IN SPORTS? 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PROJECT]; N.Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1974, § 1, at 52, col. 3.
137. The NCAA is, of course, a major opponent of Title IX. Hogan, supra note 47,
at 41.
138. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.6(c) (1977).
139. Id. § 86.31(b)(7).
140. But see M. DUNKLE, supra note 41, at 144 (§ 86.31(b)(7) is applicable to athletics).
141. See pp. 1261-62 supra.
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basis of all intercollegiate sports.142 As a result of the differences in
performance by male and female athletes, the first team (Team A)
would be primarily composed of men. Exceptional women should,
however, be allowed to compete for this team whether or not the same
sport is offered for women. Such equal opportunity to compete should
exist regardless of whether the sport is a contact sport. There is no
justification, physical or otherwise, for the contact-sports exception. 143
A school should also be required to offer a separate team for women
only (Team B) in either the same sport as Team A, if there is sufficient
interest by women, or in another highly competitive sport in which
there is greater interest.
For example, if adequate interest exists in a women's intercollegiate
football team, a Team B should be offered.14 4 In order to fulfill the
social needs of group equalization, Team B should be restricted to
women only.145 Otherwise, male athletes, although not the most highly
qualified of their sex, might take away the places of the most highly
qualified female athletes.146 Group equalization requires equal op-
portunity for the most qualified athletes of either sex to participate at
the most competitive level. As even the current regulations recognize,
athletic opportunities for women have historically been limited. Rep-
aration to women as a group is therefore a reasonable remedy.
2. Affirmative Efforts and Student-Interest Surveys
The "affirmative efforts" and annual student-interest surveys re-
quired by HEW's initial proposed regulations 147 should be reinstated.
142. See pp. 1256, 1268 sutra.
143. Cox, supra note 2, at 44-45 (exception does not further statutory purpose and is
not justified by differences between sexes; statistics regarding relative size, weight, and
likelihood of injury are irrelevant because neither average woman nor man could com-
pete, for example, in intercollegiate football); PROJEcT, supra note 136, at 6 (describes
myths regarding "damage" to women from vigorous or contact athletic activity).
144. If only a few women were interested in football, but there was much interest in
soccer or field hockey, then these would be viable alternatives. Of course, even with this
approach, there may be few women who are able to make the male football team, and
too few interested in football to justify a separate women's team. In this case, women
will have to forego the opportunity to play competitive football; a school, restricted by
limited funds, can only be required to achieve group equalization by satisfying the in-
terests of the majority of women.
145. Such a proposal is further supported by the cases that find discrimination if
there is enough of a discriminatory impact on one group, regardless of the apparent
neutrality of the regulations. See note 115 supra.
146. If the proposal is implemented, two teams would exist in intercollegiate sports-
one composed primarily of men and the other composed solely of women. In addition,
there may be any number of junior varsity teams; their structure could be more flexible
because the differences in the levels of performance may not be as notable. The basic
premise of equal opportunity to participate, however, should be followed.
147. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,236, 86.38(b), (c) (1974).
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"Affirmative efforts" would help overcome the effects of past discrim-
ination and generate women's interest in sports.14s Also annual surveys
would prevent an institution from "tracking" women into traditional
women's sports despite interest to the contrary.149 Further, such surveys
encourage the development of equal opportunities in the selection of
sports and levels of competition. 50 Both requirements would be more
important in the early stages of implementing equal opportunity than
in later stages when tracking would not be as likely to occur.
3. Equal Opportunity and Athletic Scholarships
The regulations should also require equality in all factors of the
equal-opportunity "laundry list."'1' Moreover, additional factors should
be added, namely awards and recognition, recruitment, support services,
priority use of recreational facilities, free or reduced admission to
athletic events, employment opportunities, and the organizational struc-
ture of women's and men's programs.'5 2 Most importantly, athletic
scholarships and recruitment, for both mixed and separate teams,
should be included.153 These changes would create a minimum re-
148. The "affirmative efforts" section was deleted by HEW as possibly inconsistent
with the overall remedial and affirmative action provisions, 45 C.F.R. § 86.3 (1977), which
require affirmative action only if past discrimination has been found at a particular
school. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134, 75 (1975). However, in light of the depth of sex
discrimination in sports, it seems unreasonable to require only those schools with a clear
record of discrimination to make affirmative efforts. All schools should be required to
generate interest and increase women's ability to achieve the goal of group equalization.
Further, the anti-preferential treatment provision of the statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b)
(1976), cannot be viewed as a limitation on affirmative efforts addressed to women who
are already enrolled in a university. This provision appears to be directed to original
admissions. Moreover, evidence of an imbalance in participation may be used to show
discrimination. Affirmative efforts are similar to recruitment, and lack the pernicious
effects of fixed quota provisions. This distinction has been discussed by the Supreme Court
in the context of Title VI. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2763-64
(1978).
149. See Education: Sports Sex Tracking in Loco Parentis Dress Codes, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. REP., Spring 1972, at 4. An institution might be inclined to offer only tradi-
tional feminine sports for women at the intercollegiate level, rather than to promote or
respond to interest in nontraditional women's sports. However, some institutions have
already tried to combat this tendency. For example, an interest survey of freshmen was
conducted at Yale University. Because interest existed in nontraditional women's sports,
Yale supports a women's varsity ice-hockey and crew team. Interview with Louise O'Neal,
Assistant Athletic Director, Yale University (Apr. 4, 1978) (transcript on file with Yale
Law Journal). But see note 66 supra.
150. See 45 C.F.R. § 86A1(c)(1) (1977).
151. See id. § 86A1(c)()-(10).
152. Other factors might include availability of bands and cheerleaders, opportunities
to purchase varsity "items," eligibility for membership in varsity clubs, and laundry or
maid service. See note 47 supra; M. DUNILE, supra note 41, at 127-28.
153. Athletic scholarships and recruitment are currently in separate provisions of the
regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.23, .37(c) (1977). Although scholarships and recruitment
are subject to the proposed equal per capita expenditure requirement, disparate funding
will be permissible if it results from nondiscriminatory criteria. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,073 (1978).
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quirement of equality in each major aspect of athletic programs,
equalize the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate sports, and
promote women's participation in the overall educational experience.
4. Athletic Associations
The regulations should clearly state that an institution violates Title
IX by aiding or supporting an athletic association that discriminates
on the basis of sex. Such associations are often major obstacles to
equalization efforts, not only by virtue of their political activity, but
also because they publicize and support men's sports to the exclusion
of women's sports. Membership in an athletic association should not
be permitted to defeat a program designed to prohibit discriminatory
behavior and sex stereotyping.
5. Equal Expenditures and Revenue-Producing Sports
Finally, the "necessary" expenditures provision of the current regula-
tions is inadequate.15 4 The regulations should require equal per capita
expenditures based on the total population of each sex in a college or
university. 55 In addition, there should be a specific section comple-
menting the expenditure provision clearly stating that revenue-pro-
ducing sports are to be treated like all other sports, whether or not
they are profitmaking.15 6
154. The current regulations do not specifically require equal per capita or aggregate
expenditures, although they do require "necessary" expenditures. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)
(1977). The proposed policy interpretation requires per capita, per participant expendi-
tures, but is unclear in definition and scope. See note 124 supra.
155. One commentator suggests that the regulations should not require equal aggregate
expenditures for men's and women's programs because it would involve HEW too deeply
in college finances, and suggests instead that equal funding per participant in the same
sport might be feasible. Cox, supra note 2, at 50. But isolating each sport for funding
purposes is inappropriate because different sports may be emphasized for each sex par-
ticularly at the intercollegiate level. The ACLU has made a similar proposal of equal per
capita expenditures but its proposal is based on participating populations of each sex.
ACLU Comments, supra note 121, at 13, 14; see notes 49 & 124 supra (HEW's proposed
interpretation requires equal per capita expenditures per participant). Per capita expendi-
tures should not be based on the participating population of both sexes, but should be
based on the total population of that sex in the college or university. This would prevent
an institution from covertly deterring the interest and participation of women in order
to eliminate athletic expenditures for them. Moreover, a per capita figure based on the
college's total population, rather than on participation in athletic programs, has the
advantage of increasing when the college population of women increases as a result of
Title IX. Given initial populations of the same size, the aggregate expenditures for
men's and women's programs should be equal even if the interest level is not as ex-
tensive for women as for men due to past discrimination. The additional funds may be
used for special programs to generate more interest and to improve the sports ability of
women whose previous opportunities have been limited. Moreover, gradual implementa-
tion over a four-year period, see p. 1278 infra, will allow time for an increase in interest
levels that would justify equal per capita expenditures.
156. There is no justification for financing deficits incurred by revenue-producing
sports, to the exclusion of women's sports. For example, if a sport produces revenues of
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As a result, a college or university with equal male and female
populations would either have to invest large sums in programs for
both sexes or be forced to pare the excessive benefits for men's basket-
ball and football or other large-scale, revenue-producing sports.6 7
Major opponents of Title IX fear that such a reduction or alteration
will signal the end of college sports.15s This is clearly hyperbole, since
all that such budget-cutting would require is the end of sports as a
male institution' 59-the precise goal of Title IX.
Three major arguments are posed in response to this funding sug-
gestion. It is argued that the revenues from these sports help support
other sports programs, including women's sports, and this justifies their
huge costs.10° In the final accounting, however, many of the so-called
revenue-producing programs do not even pay for their own cost.' 6 '
Another argument is that the interest in women's sports does not
justify their expense.'( 2 A related point is that there is not sufficient
public or media interest in women's intercollegiate sports to generate
revenues justifying this increased cost.163 Not only is this untrue in
S100,000 and the cost of the sport is $175,000, the $75,000 deficit should not be the basis
for estimating equal expenditures; instead the full $175,000 should be included in the
assessment. See PROJECT, supra note 136, at 14.
157. Given finite funds available for intercollegiate athletics, an institution may be
unable to afford the expenditures for these two sports for both sexes. Id. at 12; see 43
Fed. Reg. 58,072 (1978) ('very real financial problems facing institutions of higher ed-
ucation").
158. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 167 (Rep. Mink) ("NCAA claims that the Title IX
regulation will be the death knell for men's intercollegiate athletics"); id. at 103 (John A.
Fuzak, President, NCAA) (equal expenditures might well cause "disaster in this time of
economic crunch to the entire intercollegiate program at most colleges"); Hogan, suPra
note 2, at 18 (describing opponents' fear of ruination of intercollegiate athletics).
159. Cf. Hearings, supra note 5, at 185 (Rep. Blouin) (fact that regulations might hurt
collegiate football or basketball "is an indication there has been discrimination for
years").
160. Id. at 103 (John A. Fuzak, President, NCAA).
161. See id. at 286 (statement of Norma Raffel, WEAL) ("[O]nly one athletic depart-
ment in ten makes a profit. The other nine run at a deficit. According to the NCAA,
the annual deficit of its members in conducting intercollegiate athletic programs in 1974
was $49.5 million dollars [sic]."); id. at 166 (Rep. Mink) ("If the mandatory student fees
that finance most big-time college sports programs [mainly revenue-producing sports]
were subtracted out and the numerous hidden costs-such as bond issue on the stadium,
field maintenance, training equipment, et cetera-were added in, the deficit might well
be twice [the NCAA figure of $50 million]."); Hogan, Football Is Hardly Sugar Daddy,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1978, § 5, at 2 (81% of NCAA members' varsity football programs
operated at loss, even when student fees and state and federal aid were included in
program revenue). It is estimated that 95% of intercollegiate sports operate at a deficit.
See Hearings, supra note 5, at 185 (Sen. Bayh). Moreover, the operation of semiprofessional
teams by a college or university is questionable, see id. at 166 (Rep. Mink), as is the
propriety of educational institutions serving as a minor league for professional football
and basketball, see id. at 186 (Rep. Blouin).
162. See generally Hearings, sulpra note 5, at 101 (John A. Fuzak, President, NCAA).
163. See, e.g., id. ("[W]omen's sports, . . . at least as far as current indications of
spectator interest are concerned, cannot be expected to generate any revenue.")
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certain instances,'G but the failure to produce a sufficient revenue has
not stopped institutions from investing large sums in men's sports.10 5
Moreover, differential levels of interest are a poor reason for present
discrimination, since they are probably a direct result of past discrim-
ination. 6" The fact that there still remains so much interest on
campuses in women's athletic programs, despite the tremendous damp-
ening effects of sex discrimination, is evidence of the potential interest
of women.'1 7 Equal expenditures would clearly increase the interest in
and desirability of participation. 68
Finally, it is argued that the remedy is drastic because it will punish
men by depriving them of sports opportunities. This problem can be
solved, however, by implementing the provision under a timetable.16 9
The requirement should be met gradually over a four-year period in
order to accommodate the expectations of current students.
70
Conclusion
Regulations such as these, unlike the present Title IX regulations,
would address the basic problem of sex discrimination in collegiate
athletics. Their general effect would be to increase women's interest
and participation in intercollegiate sports. Increased participation by
women would lead to the development of greater skill and to broader
social acceptance of women's competitive participation. Greater skill
and broader acceptance would probably result in increased media
coverage and public interest.'
7 '
164. An example is the success of Iowa's women's basketball teams, which often draw
more paying spectators than men's basketball teams. Gilbert & Williamson, supra note
77, at 50.
165. See notes 161, 163 supra.
166. See note 108 supra.
167. Gilbert & Williamson, supra note 77, at 48; see note 168 infra.
168. See Roach, supra note 5. Despite the limitations due to discrimination, there has
been a tremendous increase in women's participation and interest at both the inter-
scholastic level (460% increase from 1971 to 1977) and the intercollegiate level (Associa-
tion for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) has grown from 301 member schools
in 1971 to 843 in 1975-76). Hogan, supra note 2, at 16, 22; see 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978)
(women's participation in intercollegiate sports increased 100% from 1970 to 1978).
169. Such a timetable also makes the equal-expenditure provisions even more reason-
able in light of the Javits Amendment standard. See pp. 1261-62 & note 54 sutra.
170. There would be almost a 100% turnover of students during a four-year period
and thus almost all preexisting expectations would be satisfied. Moreover, schools and
universities have already had a three-year grace period. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(d) (1977)
(adjustment period of three years).
171. See note 164 supra (Iowa women's basketball). In addition, the growth of women's
professional sports is a likely long-range effect. See Harvin, Female Pros Make History,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1978, § 5, at 7, col. 3.
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Such changes in the sports world would in time create equal partic-
ipation and respect for both sexes in sport and, by definition, eliminate
reliance on traditional sex-role stereotypes. The elimination of tradi-
tional sex roles in sports would demonstrate societal rejection of these
roles and would reduce their desirability in the rest of society. The
socializing effect of education would thereby be to foster individual
development in sports rather than to promote sex discrimination in
athletics and in society as a whole.
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